9_MNOOKIN_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/18/2014 9:40 AM

CHILD CUSTODY REVISITED
ROBERT MNOOKIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
When Professors Katharine Bartlett and Elizabeth Scott proposed a
symposium and accompanying issue of Law and Contemporary Problems
organized around my article Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
1
the Face of Indeterminacy, I was flattered, thrilled, and most of all surprised:
flattered because of the extraordinarily generous ways they characterized the
importance of the article to the development of family-law scholarship, thrilled
because they suggested a number of leading family-law scholars had agreed to
reflect on the article’s impact and contemporary relevance, and surprised
because my article was nearly forty years old.
It was also with a tinge of trepidation that I approached the prospect of the
symposium. For the first fifteen years of my academic career, my central
scholarly concerns were children and the law broadly, and issues relating to
2
divorce custody and the foster-care system in particular. But in the last twenty
years I have focused nearly exclusively on conflict resolution, negotiation, and
alternative dispute resolution, not family law. I was only generally abreast of
developments in custody law. I had given no thought to the continuing
relevance, if any, of my article. Truth be told, I had not even looked at, much
less read, the article in more than twenty years.
When my article appeared, Gerald Ford was President. International
concerns focused on the Soviet Union and the Cold War. The median
household income in the United States was $11,800, and the average cost of a
3
new house was $39,000. I wrote the article on a typewriter. There were no
personal computers, or cell phones. There was no world-wide web. I wondered,
Would the social, economic, political, technological, and legal changes since
1975 make my analysis seem strangely out-of-date?
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1. 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW (6th ed. 2009); see also ELEANOR E.
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3. See News and Events of 1975, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/year/1975.html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2013).
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I have now reread my article in light of the fascinating contributions to this
issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. I have asked myself, Are the
article’s two core themes—relating to the indeterminacy of the best-interests
standard and differentiating child protection from private dispute resolution—
still relevant? To what extent have changes in social norms, technology, and
legal doctrine made my analysis unresponsive to contemporary challenges for
custody law and policy? With profound gratitude to Professors Bartlett and
Scott, I offer here my observations regarding these questions.
II
THE INDETERMINACY CLAIM
The first, most fundamental claim in my article was that the best-interests
standard was indeterminate. I exposed the indeterminacy of this custody
standard by framing the judge’s decision under the standard “as a problem of
rational choice” between custodial alternatives in which the judge was being
asked to choose the alternative that would maximize “what is best for a
4
particular child.” Drawing on decision theory, a rational decisionmaker would
need to (1) specify alternative outcomes and predict the probability that each
outcome might occur, and (2) assign to each outcome a utility measure that
5
integrated his values and allowed comparisons among alternative outcomes. To
do this the judge would need considerable information, predictive ability, and
6
some source “for the values to measure utility for the child.”
After framing the best-interests standard in this way, I exposed its
indeterminacy with two basic arguments: First, “[f]or most custody cases,
existing psychological theories simply do not yield confident predictions of the
7
[long-term] effects of alternative custody dispositions.” Second, “even if
accurate predictions were possible in more cases, our society today lacks any
clear-cut consensus about the values to be used in determining what is ‘best’ or
8
‘least detrimental.’” None of the authors in this issue express any disagreement
with either of these two basic assertions.
With respect to the first of these indeterminacy arguments, I claimed,
“[P]resent-day knowledge about human behavior provides no basis for the kind
9
of individualized predictions required by the best-interests standard.” I pointed
out that there were “numerous competing theories of human behavior, based
on radically different conceptions of the nature of man” and that “no consensus
10
exists that any one is correct.” This remains true today.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 255.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
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Mental-health professionals still lack the capacity to make accurate
predictions about the long-term impact of alternative custodial dispositions on
children. Indeed, Professors Elizabeth Scott and Robert Emery suggest mentalhealth professionals today continue to use the illusion of scientific expertise to
obscure the deficiencies of the best-interests standard, not simply as expert
11
witnesses in trials but throughout the dispute-resolution process. Scott and
Emery see this as deeply problematic because such professionals “lack the
scientific knowledge to guide them in linking clinical observations or test data
to qualitative proxies for best interests or in comparing incommensurable
12
factors to make custody recommendations to the court.” Nonetheless it
appears that mental-health professionals’ plans today might play an increasingly
13
important role throughout the dispute-resolution process. Psychologists and
mental-health professionals continue to make predictive claims that cannot be
justified by social-science research.
My second indeterminacy argument also remains as relevant today as it was
in 1975. The lack of a social consensus about values still plagues best-interests
determinations. Determining what is best for a particular child inevitably
involves judgments about the hierarchy of and trade-offs between often
competing values. Presumably with the goal of providing greater guidance and
more consistent decisionmaking, many states now list criteria that a court is
14
asked to use in applying the best-interests standard. But, as Professor Bartlett
demonstrates, “the[] criteria encompass every factor potentially relevant to a
child’s welfare,” and “most of the criteria are themselves open-ended and
subjective.” In other words, the criteria do little to guide and regulate judicial
15
decisionmaking.
I would stand by my general critique of using an indeterminate standard for
child-custody adjudication. Using a best-interests standard poses fundamental
questions of fairness. It risks violating the “fundamental precept that like cases
16
should be decided alike.” It largely removes the special burden of justification
that is characteristic of adjudication, and it involves using the judicial process in
a way that is quite uncharacteristic of traditional adjudication: It requires
predictions of what will happen in the future and not determinations of what
happened in the past. A broad “person-oriented” standard risks that a judge’s
11. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling
Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.1, 2014 at 69, 91–95.
12. Id. at 92.
13. Kimberly Emery and Robert Emery point out that “expert” psychological evaluations by
mental-health professionals are now increasingly used as part of the “dispute-resolution funnel” to
encourage settlement as part of the dispute-resolution process before a judge is asked to adjudicate a
conflict. See Kimberly C. Emery & Robert E. Emery, Who Knows What is Best for Children? Honoring
Agreements and Contracts Between Parents Who Live Apart, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014
at 151, 159–61.
14. Katharine T. Bartlett, Prioritizing Past Caretaking in Child-Custody Decisionmaking, 77 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013 at 29.
15. Id.
16. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 263.
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decision will be based on “unarticulated (perhaps even unconscious) predictions
17
and preferences that could be questioned if expressed.”
In this regard, I find the distinction offered by Daniel Kahneman in his
18
recent book Thinking, Fast and Slow relevant both to my deconstruction of the
best-interests standard and my critique of its use as an adjudicatory standard.
19
Kahneman’s core idea is that human beings think in two very different ways.
One cognitive system (what he calls “System 1” or thinking fast) is fast,
instinctive, almost automatic; it draws on emotions and can be subconscious and
20
stereotypic. A second way of thinking, (“System 2”) is slower, more
21
deliberative, and logical. It is effortful, conscious, and calculating.
The decision-analytic framework I used in deconstructing the best-interests
standard is quintessentially a system-two method of thinking, a paradigmatic
22
example of what Kahneman would characterize as thinking slow. And the
product of my decision-analytic framework—the two-prong test—would also be
thinking slow, were judges to ever engage in it. By describing the best-interests
standard in these terms, I exposed its indeterminacy. But in so doing, I never
thought I was actually describing how judges make custody decisions. Indeed, a
primary problem of an indeterminate custody standard is that it invites judges
to make decisions by “thinking fast”—relying primarily on the basis of intuition,
23
visceral reaction, and gut feeling about to the parties before them.
With respect to indeterminacy, I should underscore an important limitation
on the scope of my claim: Not all custody disputes are plagued by
indeterminacy. Some custody disputes are “easy” to decide because there is a
24
social consensus about “what is very bad.” If one placement exposes a child to
substantial short-run risks of serious harm, especially irreversible harm, while
25
another placement poses no such risk, the choice is clear-cut and easy. There is
no need to make longer-term predictions or more complicated evaluations of
what is likely to happen to the child’s long-run development. However, “to be
easy, a case must involve only one claimant who is well known to the child and
26
whose conduct does not endanger the child.” More typically, custody disputes
involve more difficult choices because they do not fit this pattern. In many
private disputes, the court must choose between two claimants who each offer

17. Id.
18. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
19. Id. at 415.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. As Bartlett relates, one court noted that “[o]ften trial judges who see the witnesses in a
custody dispute come away with a gut feeling that one parent is a better fit than the other, though it may
be difficult to explain the underlying reasons.” Bartlett, supra note 14, at 66 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010)).
24. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 261.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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advantages and disadvantages and neither of whom would endanger the child.
In child-neglect proceedings, the existing home is typically far from optimal, but
placing the child with a foster family unknown to the child can pose serious
risks as well.
III
THE CLAIM CONCERNING TWO FUNCTIONS
My second fundamental claim in my article was that child-custody
adjudication can be best understood by differentiating between two different
27
judicial functions: child protection and private dispute resolution. The
distinction between these two functions remains critical because the
implications of indeterminacy are quite different depending on the function at
28
issue. Because the policy goals related to each function are different, the
search for a single set of substantive standards and procedures to govern all
custody disputes would be as unwise today as it would have been forty years
ago. None of the authors would appear to disagree.
The child-protection function involves the judicial enforcement of stateimposed minimum standards of parental behavior believed necessary for the
protection of the child. Defining the proper scope for “child protection” poses
fundamental questions concerning political and moral philosophy about the
proper allocation of power and responsibility between the family and the state.
The use of an indeterminate legal standard confers broad discretion and can
invite inappropriate intrusion into the family.
Adjudication implicates the child-protection function most commonly in
juvenile-court neglect or dependency proceedings. These occur within an
elaborate juvenile-court and social-welfare bureaucracy with responsibility for a
foster-care system. The state may retain oversight over the child for an
extended period of time—often years. An indeterminate best-interests standard
gives too much discretion to social workers, probation officers, and juvenilecourt judges to inappropriately remove children from parental custody. And for
those children who are removed, an indeterminate best-interests standard does
too little to ensure bureaucratic accountability once such children are in foster
care.
The procedures and standards for private dispute resolution play a very
different role. This function involves resolving disputes between private
27. Id. at 229.
28. The distinction also remains analytically useful in understanding the different strands of
contemporary custody law: divorce custody proceedings, guardianship proceedings, juvenile-court
neglect proceedings, and involuntary termination of parental rights as part of adoption. I demonstrate
that “either function can be involved in a judicial proceeding involving the application of any of the
four strands of custody law, and a single case may involve both strands.” Id. at 248–49. A recent
Supreme Court decision involved a private custody dispute in the context of an adoption between a
Native American biological father and adoptive parents. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(2013).
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individuals—typically two parents—who cannot agree on how to share
responsibility for the child. The state is providing a forum for resolving conflicts
that the parties have not been able to resolve on their own. Once the dispute is
resolved, the judge is typically out of the picture. The state retains no broad
authority over the child or the family.
None of this is meant to suggest that we should be unconcerned about the
use of an indeterminate standard for private dispute resolution. Its use raises
important questions concerning fairness because of the breadth of the largely
unreviewable discretion it gives to a judge. Moreover, an indeterminate
standard makes it difficult to predict the outcome of litigation. This uncertainty
might encourage more litigation and make the dispute-resolution process more
protracted and costly.
Neither my analysis of the two functions nor my critique of the best-interests
standard was based on the Constitution. As Professor Emily Buss correctly
points out, I gave the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence “only the slightest of
29
nods” in reaching my conclusions. Nor did my article focus on the
constitutional dimensions of parental rights, or the outer limits of a state’s
authority to intervene into the family in the exercise of its parens patriae
30
power. It pleases me that Professor Buss identifies what she sees as “the
striking correlation” between my “child-focused legal prescriptions and the
parent-focused developments in constitutional law” that has developed since
31
my article appeared. I can hardly claim credit for prescience. But I suspect part
of the explanation lies in what I identified as the “starting point” for my policy
analysis.
In my article I expressed a preference for what I characterized as “family
autonomy”: A starting point that “assumes that power and responsibility for
children generally ought to be vested in private hands—essentially the family—
32
except in cases where government rule can be justified.” I cited Pierce v.
33
Society of Sisters in support of this position. Supreme Court decisions since my
article certainly suggest that the Constitution itself would impose substantive
and procedural limitations on the state’s power to remove children from
29. See Emily Buss, An Off-Label Use of Parental Rights? The Unanticipated Doctrinal Antidote
for Professor Mnookin’s Diagnosis, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 1, 2.
30. As Professor Buss notes, in 1975 there were only a handful of Supreme Court cases that
touched upon the constitutional basis for parental rights. Id. at 2. She identifies Meyer, Pierce, Prince,
Yoder, and Stanley. Id. at 3. The first edition of my casebook, which appeared in 1978, did, among other
things, focus on the constitutional dimensions of the allocation of power and responsibility for children.
See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW (1st ed. 1978). Now in its sixth edition, the amount of constitutional material in the
casebook has expanded considerably over the years. Compare MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 2,
with MNOOKIN, supra.
31. See Buss, supra note 29, at 2.
32. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 266. The other two starting points were (1) state paternalism,
which assumes that the state has primary responsibility for children and ought to exercise full control
over their lives, except where delegation of the family is justified, and (2) agnosticism, which rests on no
preference and instead approaches individual policy issues on their own merits.
33. Id. at 266–67 & n,188 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).
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34

parental custody. Indeed, with respect to the child-protection function,
Professor Buss hints that the requirement of “reasonable efforts” before
35
removal might have a constitutional underpinning. With respect to private
dispute resolution, as Buss points out there is no constitutional impediment to
my stated preference for a psychological parent’s claim over that of a genetic
36
parent who lacks any substantial prior connection to the child’s life.
IV
CHANGING GENDER ROLES AND CUSTODY STANDARDS
Claims relating to gender roles and gender equity have long been central to
family-law policy debates. In my article I traced the prior evolution of custody
standards from a paternal preference, through fault-based standards, to a
37
maternal preference. Indeed, in 1975 I reported that the maternal preference
was rapidly “being displaced by a formal insistence on a neutral application of
38
the best-interests standard.” I attributed the trend to “no fault divorce, the
changing social conception of the appropriate sex roles, and the women’s
39
movement.”
The contributions to this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems suggest
that today the indeterminate best-interests standard is still the dominant
40
standard. But during the intervening years, advocates worked with limited
34. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that in light of constitutional right of
parents to rear their children, Washington state allowing any third party to petition state courts for
child-visitiation rights over parental objections is unconstitutional); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires more than a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in any procedure in which a state seeks to terminate the rights
of parents in light of evidence that the child is neglected).
35. See Buss, supra note 29, at 19.
36. Id. at 27. Relevant in this regard is the recent Supreme Court decision rejecting a statutory
claim brought under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963
(2006), by a biological father who sought to block an adoption. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133
S. Ct. 2552 (2013). In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the South Carolina Supreme Court had read the
ICWA to deny an adoption that would have otherwise have been valid under state law on the basis of
an objection by the Native American biological father, who had had no previous role in the child’s life.
Id. at 2556. In a majority opinion for the Court, after “assuming for sake of argument” that the
biological father was a “parent” under the ICWA, Justice Alito chose to read the statutory provisions
narrowly, and therefore rejected the father’s claim. Id. at 2557. In his dissent, Justice Scalia wrote,
The Court’s opinion, it seems to me, needlessly demeans the rights of parenthood. It has been
the constant practice of the common law to respect the entitlement of those who bring a child
into the world to raise the child. We do not inquire whether leaving the child with his parents
is ‘in the best interests of the child.’ It sometimes is not; he would be better off raised by
someone else. But parents have their rights, no less than children do. This father wants to
raise his daughter, and the statute amply protects his right to do so.
Id. at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. See Mnookin, supra note 1.
38. Id. at 235.
39. Id. at 235–36.
40. As earlier noted, many states now identify factors that courts are to take into account in
determining best interests, but Professor Bartlett demonstrates these changes do little to make the
standard more determinate. Bartlett, supra note 14, at 30.
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success to displace the best-interests standard with new custody standards,
which were much more determinate. In courts and state legislatures a gender
41
war over custody standards has marked the last forty years. The main
42
contenders have been (1) presumptions in favor of joint custody and (2)
presumptions that would base custody on how parents allocated child-rearing
43
responsibilities before they separated. Fathers’ rights groups have relentlessly
pressed for joint-custody presumptions, and women’s groups have vigilantly
44
resisted. The approximation standard has been vigorously opposed by fathers’
45
groups, while supported by the elite American Law Institute (ALI). One of
the puzzles explored in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is why
46
women’s groups have not championed this alternative. To put the battles over
divorce-custody standards in perspective, I have found it helpful to look at the
extent to which the division of responsibilities between fathers and mothers in
two-parent households has evolved.
A. Evolving Gender Roles and the Division of Family Responsibilities
Within a household with children and two parents living together, there are
three major functions that must be performed: (1) providing for the economic
support of the family, (2) providing day-to-day care for the children, and (3)
performing the household chores to keep the family enterprise going. With
respect to all three functions, there have been dramatic changes.
Forty years ago, the “traditional” middle-class American arrangement
involved a considerable degree of gender-role differentiation: The father was
the breadwinner responsible for working outside the home to earn income for
the family, and the mother was primarily responsible for child rearing and
housework. She had no paid work in the labor market outside the home.
After World War II and through 1960 this traditional allocation was clearly
dominant. By the time my article appeared this traditional allocation was
already breaking down. Today it is the exception and not the rule. In 1960, only
27.6% of married women with children under eighteen participated in the labor

41. See Scott & Emery, supra note 11, at 76–83.
42. See id. at 77–80; see also Bartlett, supra note 14, at 30.
43. I refer here to both the primary-parent standard and the approximation standard. See Richard
Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 168, 169 (1984) (describing the primary-parent standard); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,
Parental Preference and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 617 (1992) (describing the
approximation standard); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2002); Bartlett, supra note 14, at 32; Scott & Emery, supra note 11, at 76.
Although very similar, the two are not identical. A court applying the primary-parent standard would
award custody to a parent who had done more, such that he or she was “primary.” A court applying the
approximation standard would allocate time after divorce in a way that approximated how the parents
shared responsibilities during the marriage.
44. See Susan Dominus, The Fathers’ Crusade, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 8, 2005, at 26, 50.
45. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.08 (2002).
46. See Scott & Emery, supra note 11, at 70–71.
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concluded, “Fathers have nearly tripled their time with children since 1965.” A
large gender gap in time spent with children remains: “[M]others spend about
52
twice as much time with their children as fathers do.” (In 2011, mothers spent
53
about 13.5 hours per week, compared with 7.3 hours for fathers).
There is a similar trend for housework. “Fathers’ time spent doing
household chores has more than doubled since 1965 (from an average of about
54
four hours per week to about 10 hours). Mothers’ time doing housework has
decreased significantly over the same timeframe (from 32 hours per week to
55
18). The Pew report concludes,
Fathers now spend more time engaged in housework and child care than they did half
a century ago . . . . Fathers have by no means caught up to mothers in terms of time
spent caring for children and doing housework chores, but there has been
some
56
gender convergence in the way they divide their time between work and home.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
See id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 3.
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AND

DADS

These trends provide fuel for both sides of the gender wars that plague
divorce policy. On the one hand, fathers’ groups point to the fact that today
57
married women work in proportions nearly equal to men. They can also claim
58
that during marriage fathers are now spending more time with the children.
But women’s advocates can show that during marriage mothers earn less than
57. See Jocelyn Elise Crowley, Adopting “Equality Tools” from the Toolboxes of their
Predecessors: The Fathers’ Rights Movement in the United States, in FATHERS’ RIGHTS ACTIVISM AND
LAW REFORM IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 79, 86–87 (Richard Collier & Sally Sheldon eds., 2006).
58. Id.
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fathers and have far greater child-rearing responsibilities. The legal standards
governing both the financial and custodial arrangements should reflect these
realities.
B. The Joint-Custody Presumption
I have long opposed presumptions in favor of joint physical custody. About
three years after my child-custody adjudication article was published, I wrote
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce with Lewis
60
Kornhauser. Our core insight was that the legal standard used by courts to
61
adjudicate disputes also provides a backdrop for out-of-court bargaining. We
suggested that a joint-custody standard created a dilemma: Although it had
some good characteristics as a background rule for private ordering outside of
court it was inappropriate as a standard for a judge in court to impose.
The advantages of the joint-custody rule from the perspective of bargaining
are that it does not disadvantage the relatively risk-averse parent, reduces the
scope for strategic behavior, and imposes lower transaction costs. Nevertheless,
it would probably be disastrous to impose joint custody on the parties that could
not agree to it themselves, because joint custody normally requires a very high
degree of parental cooperation. Without such cooperation, the substantial
contact both parents would have with the child, and necessarily with each other,
would create endless possibilities for antagonism between the parents, with
predictably detrimental effects on the child’s well-being. Ordering joint custody
62
might be very much like carrying out Solomon’s threat to cut the child in half.
In Dividing the Child, Eleanor Maccoby and I rejected a presumption in
favor of joint physical custody because of our deep concern that the use of joint
custody in cases where there was substantial parental conflict would harm
63
children.
We do not think it good for children to feel caught in the middle of parental conflict,
and in those cases where the parents are involved in bitter dispute, we believe a
presumption for joint custody would do harm. Our study suggests that in a number of
cases in which families today adopt joint physical custody, there has been substantial
legal conflict. To the extent that this custody arrangement is the result of
encouragement by mediators, or judges for that matter, we think it is unwise. We wish
to note, however, that joint custody can work very well when parents are able to
cooperate. Thus we are by no means recommending that joint custody be denied to
64
parents who want to try it.

I found fascinating the article by Bruce Smyth, Richard Chisholm, Bryan
Rodgers, and Vu Son, reporting on their valuable research on the Australian

59. See Lyn Craig, Does Father Care Mean Fathers Share?: A Comparison of How Mothers and
Fathers in Intact Families Spend Time with Children, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 256, 270 (2006).
60. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 980 (internal citations omitted).
63. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 150.
64. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 284–85 (1992).
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experience with legislation encouraging “shared-time parenting.” Their study
66
is intriguing and their empirical findings are important and very valuable.
I would offer the following five observations. First, the Australian legislation
67
was the result of lobbying by fathers’ groups. Second, the Australian law on its
face does not create a presumption in favor of joint physical custody. Instead,
the Australian presumption of “equal, shared parental responsibility” is akin to
a presumption in favor of what in the United States would be characterized as
68
joint legal (as opposed to physical) custody. Third, since the reforms of 2006,
shared-time parenting is not being imposed frequently by courts in contested
cases. Figure 4 in Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers, and Son’s article suggests that in
the most recent time period only three percent of litigated cases resulted in
court orders of equal time. As Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers, and Son report this
decline “seems appropriate . . . because fully adjudicated cases tend to exhibit
69
entrenched, high levels of parental conflict.” Fourth, equal-time arrangements
were the result of negotiated settlements in between fourteen and nineteen
70
percent of litigated cases. Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers, and Son did not find any
evidence, however, that the new law was having a substantial effect in this
71
regard. Fifth, “shared parenting” is being adopted most frequently by
“cooperative parents,” typically middle class persons with elementary school–
72
aged children. In our California study we also found that shared parenting was
rarely chosen by divorcing parents with either very young children or teenage
73
children.
C. The Approximation Standard
Were I in a state legislature I would vote in favor of the ALI proposals and
prefer the approximation standard to the indeterminate best-interests standard
for the resolution of private disputes. What explains the “puzzling persistence”

65. See Belinda Fehlberg et al., Legislating for Shared Time Parenting After Separation: A
Research Review, 25 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 318 (2011); accord Bruce Smyth, Richard Chisholm,
Bryan Rodgers & Vu Son, Legislating for Shared-Time Parenting After Parental Separation: Insights
from Australia?, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 109.
66. Fehlberg also suggests that Australia provides a broad range of family-support services to
divorcing couples that I would hope American states might consider. Fehlberg et al., supra note 65, at
326–27.
.
67 See Patrick Parkinson, Changing Policies Regarding Separated Fathers in Australia, in THE
ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 578, 580 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 5th ed. 2010).
68. Janet R. Jeske, Issues in Joint Custody & Shared Parenting: Lessons from Australia, BENCH &
B. MINN., Dec. 13, 2011, at 20, 21.
69. Smyth et al., supra note 65, at 141.
70. Smyth et al., supra note 65, at 137 fig.5.
71. In our study, there were 166 cases in which the decree provided for joint custody. But nearly
all of these were the result of a negotiated or mediated resolution. Of the 933 cases in our study, a judge
decided only fourteen, which is 1.5%. Of these adjudicated cases that a judge decided, only four
resulted in a joint-custody award.
72. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 239.
73. Id. at 247.
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74

of the best-interests standard?
Scott and Emery suggest, correctly in my view, that the best-interests
standard offers lawmakers safe shelter in circumstances when either of the two
more determinate alternatives—joint custody or the approximation standard—
are sure to provoke hostile fire from either mothers’ advocates or fathers’
75
groups. But a puzzle remains. What explains the failure of women’s advocates
to more actively champion the approximation standard given that, at least
under current parental-role allocation, it more often than not results in the
76
mother being recognized as the primary custodial parent?
Part of the answer lies in the data about the continued evolution of gender
roles during marriage and the fact that the best-interests standard is more
“neutral.” In my article, I underscored that “[s]ex-based rules have been tried
historically and are now being discarded (correctly in my view) because they
reflect value judgments and sexual stereotypes that our society is in the process
77
of rejecting.”
The approximation standard is gender neutral on its face. It does not
explicitly provide for a maternal preference. Those fathers who during marriage
spent considerable time with the children would have that prior commitment
honored. Nonetheless, given the data concerning the actual allocation of childrearing responsibilities in most marriages, a legal realist might claim that the
78
approximation standard amounts to a maternal preference “in disguise.”
Although dressed up in gender-neutral garb, in actual operation it would
typically result in something akin to a maternal preference. This explains the
vehement political opposition of fathers’ groups.
That the approximation standard can be seen as a disguised maternal
preference also explains the ambivalence some feminists perhaps feel. Many
women are deeply troubled by the extent to which gender-role differentiation
persists in our society. The roles of women within the household—especially
with regard to parenting—and opportunities in the labor market are connected.
During marriage the mother in most American families today has much greater
79
child-rearing responsibility than the father. Many feminists aspire for a world
in which fathers and mothers share child-rearing responsibilities much more
80
equally. Reinforcing the current reality—which, as the data shows, is a long
way from equal distribution—sacrifices that dream and might perpetuate the
stereotype that mothers should be primarily responsible for childrearing.
74. See Scott & Emery, supra note 11, at 69.
75. Id. at 82–83.
76. Of course, should gender roles continue to evolve, resulting in more equal sharing of parental
responsibilities, the approximation standard would itself evolve away from a de facto maternal
preference.
77. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 284.
78. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 284–85.
79. Id.
80. Catherine I. Bolzendahi & Daniel J. Myers, Feminist Attitudes and Support for Gender
Equality: Opinion Change in Women and Men, 1974–1998, 83 SOC. FORCES 759, 769 (2004).
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There is also a fairness argument. After all, as David Chambers argued,
there was no evidence, other than for very young children, that after divorce a
fit father could not learn to be as good a primary parent as a mother who had
81
previously occupied that role. Although there is some power to this argument,
as Chambers recognized, it does not make the approximation standard unfair to
82
fathers. During the marriage, a father who has played a substantial role in
child rearing would at the time of divorce bargain against a backdrop that
considered that reality. As Eleanor Maccoby and I pointed out,
A woman who has served as the primary parent, after all, has already largely
developed and demonstrated the skills to care for the child on an everyday basis.
While her post-divorce role as custodial 83
parent would require change, she has much
less to learn in most cases than the father.

I remain of the view that “her experience as well as his inexperience strikes us
84
as relevant to the custodial decision.” Moreover, during a time that gender
roles are evolving, the approximation standard provides a transitional rule that
appeals to my pragmatic instincts.
D. The Impact of Law on Social Change
Let me add a few words explaining why I believe that even if widely adopted
as a replacement to the best-interests standard, the ALI standard would not in
actual operation lead to a distribution of outcomes that would be substantially
different than presently achieved under the best-interests standard. I am of the
view that changes in custody standards are unlikely to have a significant impact
on how parents allocate child-rearing responsibilities either before or after
divorce. Law more typically reflects and perhaps reinforces the underlying
social reality. Changing gender roles poses a macrochallenge that is too
85
formidable for law to affect substantially.
Claims relating to gender equality and gender equity have been central to
family-law policy debates for decades. As Eleanor Maccoby and I found in our
empirical study of California divorce, gender-role differentiation with respect to
parenting that follows divorce rests largely on differential roles that parents
86
occupied before the separation.
Unless family law can modify predivorce roles, I remain doubtful that
custody standards can have much greater impact on the postdivorce division of
responsibilities: “[M]ost divorcing families couples would still end up allocating
87
primary child-rearing responsibilities to mothers.” I think this would be true
under a best-interests standard. I also think it would be true under the
81. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MICH. L. REV. 477, 511 (1984).
82. Id.
83. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 283–84.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 280.
86. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 279.
87. Id.
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approximation standard. Indeed, Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers, and Son’s article
suggests that it remains true in Australia, notwithstanding Australia’s
88
presumption in favor of shared parental responsibility.
This is not to say custody standards are of no practical importance. A
standard might affect outcomes in some cases, and a custody standard might
have some impact on the mother’s bargaining power with respect to economic
issues. The approximation standard might increase the bargaining position of
women and decrease the risk that fathers could strategically use a custody claim
under the vague best-interests standard as a bargaining chip to reduce economic
89
support. But as we found in Dividing the Child, even under the best-interests
standard, at least where there are reasonably precise support guidelines, there is
no evidence that a father’s strategic use of custody conflict leads to less financial
90
support for women.
E. Custody Conflicts Involving Same-Sex Households
Nancy Polikoff correctly points out that in my article I did not anticipate the
way “legal” and “cultural” changes might disrupt the assumed definition of
91
natural parent.” There is not a word in my article about custody disputes
involving same-sex couples and I did not anticipate the remarkable changes in
92
93
public attitudes towards same-sex adoption and same-sex marriage. Nor is
there a discussion of conflicts that can arise today where a child has been
conceived through new assisted reproductive technologies or carried to term
through a surrogacy arrangement. Since 1975 extraordinary technological
developments have created radically new possibilities in terms of human
94
95
reproduction. In vitro fertilization did not exist in 1975. These developments
88. See Smyth et al., supra note 65, at 137 fig.5, 138.
89. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 284 (discussing the primary-parent standard in
this regard).
90. Id. at 11.
91. See Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their
Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 195, 195–96.
92. Surveys suggest that the percentage of Americans now supporting adoption by same-sex
couples has more than doubled in the last eighteen years. See Susan Page, Attitudes Toward Gays
Changing Fast, Poll Finds, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2012, at A1.
93. In 1996 when the Defense of Marriage Act was signed, it was estimated that only one-quarter
of the American public supported same sex marriage. Public Opinion of Same-Sex Marriage in the
United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_opinion_of_same-sex_marriage_in_the_
United_States (last modified June 6, 2014). A May 9, 2013 Washington Post–ABC News poll found that
55% of Americans support same-sex marriage, 40% oppose, and 5% are undecided. The same poll
suggests that one-third of those who now support same-sex marriage say they once held the opposite
view and have changed their opinion. GARY LANGER, POLL FINDS MAJORITY ACCEPTANCE OF GAYS
FROM THE B-BALL COURT TO THE BOY SCOUTS (2013), available at http://www.langerresearch.com/
uploads/1144a19GayRights.pdf. Media reports covering same-sex parenting have become increasingly
mainstream. For example, a recent Vermont Public Radio audio report detailed a same-sex couple’s
efforts to have the nonbiological mother formally adopt their child. See Abigail Mnookin, Second
Parent Adoption, VT. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:43 PM), http://digital.vpr.net/post/mnookin-secondparent-adoption.
94. See Polikoff, supra note 91, at 209–11.
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have brought to court disputes that do not fit comfortably or neatly into existing
96
legal categories.
Polikoff’s article is centrally concerned with the sort of custody dispute that
might arise between two mothers who while living in a lesbian relationship have
decided “to bring a child into their relationship and to raise that child together,
97
with each of them acting as a parent.” How should the law respond?
Let me first deal with the easy case. Suppose the second mom who is not
biologically related to the child, with the consent of the biological mother, goes
through a state-sanctioned adoption process and becomes an adoptive parent.
As Polikoff presumably recognizes, a court applying the test I proposed in my
article would not differentiate the rights of an adoptive parent from those of a
98
biological or “natural” parent. In other words, if the second mom had adopted
the child she would in my view stand on equal legal footing with the biological
mother.
But suppose the second mom does not adopt the child. Under the approach
suggested in my article, what would her rights be? For private dispute
resolution, I proposed three intermediate rules that I claimed were not plagued
by indeterminacy: (1) custody should not be awarded to a claimant whose
limitations or conduct would endanger the health of a child under the minimum
standards of child protection, (2) the court should prefer a psychological parent
over any claimant, including a “natural” or biological parent, who, from the
child’s perspective, is not a psychological parent, and (3) subject to the first two
rules, “natural parents” (by which I meant biological parents) should be
99
preferred over others.
The second mom would surely qualify as a “psychological” parent. For some
disputes this rule would vindicate the relational interests of the second mom.
She would prevail in a custody fight with a nonparent third party—perhaps a
collateral relative of some sort—who is not a psychological parent. It would also
cover a case in which the biological mom had somehow become a stranger to
the child.
Polikoff’s concern, however, is my response to what I see as a harder case—
a custody fight between two moms, both of whom are psychological parents, but
only one of whom is a biological or adoptive parent. The application of my third
intermediate rule, with its preference for a “natural parent” would seem to
place a biological mother who is also a psychological parent on a superior
footing to a second mom who is not biologically related to the child but is a
psychological parent.

95. Id. at 211–19.
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
97. See Polikoff, supra note 91, at 196.
98. See id. at 195 (indicating that “adoptive” and “natural” parents are both included in the
Uniform Parentage Act).
99. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 282–83.
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I must confess I did not have a case like this in mind when I proposed my
100
third intermediate rule that “natural parents should be preferred over others.”
I justified this third standard by claiming that
[i]n a dispute where the natural parent poses no danger to the child’s physical health
and is viewed by the child as a psychological parent, a preference for that natural
parent over a third party gives expression to broadly shared social values about
parental responsibilities for the welfare
of their offspring and reflects the importance
101
to the child of a sense of lineage.

But when the two parents have raised the child together since infancy, I am
unsure there is “a broadly shared social value” that would support the
102
preference. I am sympathetic to Polikoff’s claim that the lesbian partner who
has raised the child since birth should be treated as a parent for purposes of the
private dispute–settlement function—a parent on equal footing with a biological
103
or “natural” parent. When the two moms are married at the time of the child’s
arrival in the household, this would not seem much of a doctrinal stretch. Even
if the moms are not married, I suspect some courts will develop a doctrine of de
facto adoption that could be applied to Polikoff’s case.
For me the most difficult case would be dispute in a state where both
marriage and adoption were available to the second mom when the child
arrived but neither was pursued. In such circumstances, I am not persuaded the
de facto parent should stand on an equal footing with the biological parent. I
am not offended by the notion that equal footing should require either marriage
or a formal legal adoption by the second mom, assuming state law provides
these options. I would apply the same standard to an unmarried heterosexual
couple that had raised a child since birth if the child is biologically related to
only one parent and has not been adopted by the other.
F. Process Implications
In my article I suggested that a “primary implication of the indeterminacy of
the best-interests standard is that the legal process should encourage the parties
104
themselves to work out their own resolution.” Since the article, there has been
extraordinary expansion of the use of a variety of mediation and other methods
to facilitate parental negotiation. Scott and Emery are entirely correct when
they point out that the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard is an
105
important rationale for mediation. As I and others have noted, the traditional
adversarial process used to resolve custody conflicts can in itself often make
106
things worse for the child. It can inflame conflict, and further strain or even
destroy a conflicted coparenting relationship. I entirely endorse the notion that
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Polikoff, supra note 91, at 219–20.
See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 292.
See Scott & Emery, supra note 11, at 108.
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 956.
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there should be judicial deference to parental agreements. In this regard I
107
completely agree with the ALI’s recommendation. I am moreover very
sympathetic with Kimberly Emery and Robert Emery’s suggestion that we
eliminate judicial review of consensual parental agreements concerning custody
108
altogether.
In her fascinating article, Jana Singer explores “the close connection
between changes in substantive child-custody doctrine and changes in custody
109
dispute–resolution processes over the past thirty years.” She is surely correct
that the “unmediated best-interests standard, and the ensuing rejection of the
sole-custody paradigm, paved the way for the shift from adversarial to
110
nonadversarial resolution in divorce-related parenting disputes.” Indeed, if
the function is to facilitate private dispute settlement, then members of the legal
system should devote energy to thinking about processes that might encourage
and facilitate the resolution of disputes without the need for formal
adjudication.
What I found especially intriguing was Singer’s claim that the shift from
adversarial to nonadversarial dispute resolution has itself had an effect on the
substantive standards—to a degree it has “delegalized custody decisionmaking
111
and has diminished the importance of custody as a legal concept.” A striking
112
example relates to the contemporary emphasis on the parenting plan. To
frame the parental decision in terms of a parental-planning process—of how to
allocate responsibilities for childrearing—rather than a decision about who has
custody and who has visitation rights is surely constructive. I share Singer’s view
that “collaborative lawyering” also represents a process innovation that
probably diminishes the importance of the formal legal custody norms in
113
framing and resolving family disputes.

107. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.06 (2002).
108. Emery & Emery, supra note 13, at 168–69. Lewis Kornhauser and I examined the possible
justifications for requiring judicial proceedings in cases where there was no dispute and largely found
them wanting. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 992–96.
109. Jana B. Singer, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close Connection
Between Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related Parenting Disputes, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 177.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 178.
112. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.09(2) (2002); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375(9) (2000); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-234(1) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.181(1) (2001); Carl E. Schneider, On the Duties
and Rights of Parents, 81 VA. L. REV. 2477, 2485–86 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating
Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 687, 720; Sally Burnett Sharp, Modification of
Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263, 1280 (1982).
113. Singer, supra note 109, at 190–91.
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V
THE CHILD-PROTECTION FUNCTION
I learned a great deal from Clare Huntington’s wonderful article, The Child114
Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy. Huntington describes both the
legislative overhaul of the child-welfare system—particularly with respect to
federal legislation—that has occurred since my article and what is known of its
115
present operation. She encapsulates her findings as follows:
To a remarkable degree, the reforms Mnookin proposed to the child-welfare system
are what Congress and the states adopted in the following two decades. And yet
reading Mnookin’s article is also a Groundhog Day experience. The problems he
described
with the child-welfare system nearly forty years ago sound all too familiar
116
today.

To address the deficiencies of the foster-care system, I proposed two core
reforms. First, I proposed a much stricter standard for removing a child from
117
parental custody. I suggested that removal only be allowed (1) if there is “an
118
immediate and substantial danger to the child’s health” and (2) if there were
“no reasonable means” acceptable to the parents by which the state could
119
protect the child’s health without removal.
Second, for those children that were removed I suggested the use of time
120
limits. During an initial period the state should be required to make
121
reunification efforts. Then, after a fixed period of time, if notwithstanding
these reunification efforts the child could not be safely returned to his home,
the state should focus its efforts on permanency planning, preferably through
122
adoption or guardianship.
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) had as
its stated goals protecting children within their homes and, for children that had
to be removed more promptly, taking action to return them to parental
123
custody. As Huntington points out, the federal legislation requires states to
develop somewhat more focused standards for removal and significantly
authorized funds both for “preservation services” and for “reunification
124
services.” As Huntington documents, the AACWA did not succeed in
125
She also shows, however, that
reducing the foster-care population.
notwithstanding the new federal mandates, the states often provided little in the
114. Clare Huntington, The Child-Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 221.
115. Id. at 222–29.
116. See id. at 221.
117. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 278.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 280.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C).
124. Huntington, supra note 114, at 227.
125. Id. at 228.
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way of preservation services and courts did little to provide for accountability.
127
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) shifted the focus
away from reducing the number of removals and getting children back home
128
more promptly and towards stimulating more timely permanency planning.
As Huntington notes, the ASFA set a time limit on family-reunification efforts
and conditioned federal funds on permanency planning and substantial state
efforts to terminate parental rights for children who had been in foster care for
129
130
more than a given period of time. It also created subsidies for adoption.
As a result of these congressional actions all states now require child131
welfare agencies to provide preservation services. But Huntington reports
neither the states nor Congress have invested much by way of resources in these
132
services. It is troubling to learn that evaluations of the impact suggest that
these services might not have much effect on the maltreatment rates for
children. It is nonetheless stunning that Congress allocates twelve times as
133
much for foster-care services as for family services.
134
Regrettably no state has yet adopted a stringent removal standard.
Huntington therefore finds that “despite a greater emphasis on family
preservation, the underlying removal standard has not changed much since 1975
135
and is not significantly more determinate.”
Huntington also reports that the ASFA has resulted in the states
incorporating time limits for children in foster care, and placing much more
136
emphasis on permanency planning for children taken from parental custody.
These efforts aimed at permanency planning are obviously having an effect.
137
The foster-care population has declined substantially since my article. The
primary reason for this is that the average stay in foster care has become on
138
balance shorter. I think this is largely the result of permanency planning.
Professor Huntington makes a strong case for reorienting the child-welfare
139
system towards prevention. I would certainly support the sorts of polices she
suggests, and particularly think that nurse and family-support programs and
126. Id.
127. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
128. See Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2001).
129. Huntington, supra note 114, at 229.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 231–32.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 230.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 221–23.
137. See Leroy H. Pelton, Not for Poverty Alone: Foster Care Population Trends in the Twentieth
Century, 14 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 37, 43–44 (1987).
138. KATHY BARBELL & MADELYN FREUNDLICH, FOSTER CARE TODAY 13 (2001), available at
http://www.docs.lakotalaw.org/ombudsman%20rebuttal%20sources/foster_care_today.pdf.
139. Huntington, supra note 114, at 245–48.
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child-centered early-childhood education are worthy of support. For me her
article suggests some interesting questions about how law can be used to
provide greater bureaucratic accountability, as well as to elucidate the extent to
which services are successful in preventing harm and the degree to which
spending money to provide incentives and subsides might be more important
than legal constraints.
VI
CONCLUSION
The articles in this issue suggest both continuity and change. For the private
dispute–resolution function, the indeterminate best-interests standard remains
ascendant notwithstanding my critique. Indeed, for this function the most
important reason for the continuing relevance of my old article is the stubborn
persistence of the best-interests standard. Moreover, for reasons I articulated in
my article, the lack of a social consensus about appropriate gender roles makes
it difficult to formulate alternative standards that would be broadly accepted.
With respect to process, however, the years since my article have witnessed an
explosive growth of mediation and other less adversarial methods of resolving
conflicts.
With respect to child protection, the law has substantially changed, largely
as a result of federal legislation and dollars that have influenced the states. But
states have not changed the legal standards governing removal, and I suspect
children today are being placed in foster care in circumstances when preventive
and preservation services would have allowed them to be protected within their
homes. On the other hand, I am gratified by the evidence that my suggestions
for time limits after placement have not only been adopted but appear to be
having a beneficial effect.
To answer the questions I posed at the outset, I believe the article’s two core
themes have withstood the test of time remarkably well. And to a surprising
degree, the analysis remains relevant to contemporary challenges for custody
law and policy.

